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ARGUMENT
The

District

Court Erroneouslv Concluded That Price

Where The Record Shows He Knowingly And
A.

Counsel
Intelligentlv Chose To Represent Himself

Introduction

The
and

Was Denied The Right To

it

district court erred in

two

respects:

It

erroneously shifted the burden 0f proof

erroneously reviewed the adequacy of the waiver of counsel instead of determining

if there

was a

denial of counsel.

acknowledges

that the district court erred

(Respondent’s

brief, p. 5.)

the district court’s order

by

shifting the

Because Price has confessed this

0n

this basis.

error, this

Price also argues that he

right to counsel. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 5-9.)

necessarily a decision t0 not be represented

representation

is

is

Court should vacate

was denied

It

was

A decision t0 represent oneself is, however,

by

counsel.

Outright reversal 0f the district

the result of being denied the right to counsel as opposed to his

Alternatively, vacating the district court’s order

District Court’s Reversal

was

the right t0

not a valid waiver of the

Of The Burden Of Proof Is

is

required.

Reversible Error

Price’s “burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently

his right t0 the assistance

own

and remanding for

application 0f the correct burden of proof and the correct legal standard

The

state.

appropriate because Price did not meet his burden of proving his self-

voluntary choice.

B.

appeal Price

burden of proof to the

counsel because invocation 0f the right to self—representation

court’s order

On

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-10.)

of counsel.” Iowa V. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 92 (2004). The

waive

district

court reversed this burden 0f proof, holding that the state had the burden of proving an

adequate waiver of the right to counsel, and that every presumption against such a waiver

was being employed by the
(Respondent’s

court.

(R., p. 79.) Price

is

because he “demonstrated that the record was
fails

district court erred.

brief, p. 5.)

Price argues, however, that the error

argument

concedes that the

because the record,

voluntarily and knowingly

waived

a

at

not reversible because

it is

“immaterial”

silent as t0 his alleged waiver.”

minimum, supports an

his right t0 counsel

by choosing

(Id.)

inference that Price

to represent himself.

“This Court has remanded for application of the correct burden 0f proof
district court

Bank Nat. Ass’n N.D.

337 P.3d 605, 611 (2014).

a

P.2d 253, 260 (1991),

V.

CitiMortgage,

Inc.,

157 Idaho 446, 452,

“Although misapplication of the burden of proof does not

invariably result in prejudice,”

Alumet V. Bear Lake Grazing

“[i]f

a

decision,

taken as

Co., 119 Idaho 946, 953, 812

appears

a Whole,

misapprehension of law, the proper appellate response

is to

t0

reﬂect

a

vacate the decision and t0

the case for reconsideration in light of the proper legal framework,” Thrall V. St.

Luke’s Reg’l Med.

Ctr.,

157 Idaho 944,

marks omitted, bracketed material

_, 342 P.3d 656, 661 (2015) (internal quotation

altered).

E

also Frontier Dev. G111,

157 Idaho 589, 598, 338 P.3d 1193, 1202 (2014)
standard and accordingly erred in

its

(trial

analysis”).

misallocation of the burden 0f proof because the

t0

when

placed the burden of proof on the wrong party and in contradiction of well-

established law.” U.S.

remand

This

Caravella,

court “applied an erroneous legal

Remand

trial

LLC V.

is

the proper

remedy

for

court “should have the opportunity

reweigh the evidence” under the proper burden of proof. Papin

V. Papin,

166 Idaho

9,

_, 454 P.3d 1092, 1115 (2019).
Far from being harmless, the
reﬂects a misapprehension of law.

district court’s error

The

district court

was

central to

noted that the

its

state

analysis and

had correctly

argued that Price “cannot simultaneously invoke his right to counsel while also
representing himself.”

(R., p. 79.)

It

reasoned, however, that because there

was “no

evidence in the record” that Price “intended t0 relinquish 0r abandon his right to counsel”

when he represented himself, the state had failed to meet its burden ofproof.
original).)

Because

it

was

Price,

however,

Who had the burden ofproof,

determination that there was n0 evidence on the central issue before
in denial

0n the

of Price’s motion. At a minimum, the

district court’s

central issue demonstrates that a different result

is

(Id.

(emphasis

the district court’s

should have resulted

it

ﬁnding 0f a lack of evidence

possible under a properly applied

burden 0f proof.
Moreover, the record demonstrates that Price had sufﬁcient information to make a
choice as to whether he Wished to be represented by counsel.
Price

was shown a Video explaining

governmental expense

if

E

To_var, 541 U.S. at 92.

his right to counsel, including his right to counsel at

he was indigent, and Price acknowledged seeing the Video and

understanding the rights explained therein. (Exhibit A,
2, Ls. 4-10).) Price stated that

(TL, p. 2, Ls. 15-22).) The

at

00:30 — 00:40; Exhibit

trial

trial

judge in the underlying

DUI case

set a pre-trial

B

B

conference

(T12, p. 2, L.

21

—

Exhibit C.) Price presented no evidence ofwhat happened at the scheduled pre-

hearing.

At a

later pre-trial

conference held on March

9,

2017, Price entered into a

plea agreement whereby the state would withdraw the excessive

not object to a Withheld judgment, and the matter

was scheduled

change of plea hearing. (Exhibit D.) The prosecutor
pre-trial

(T12, p.

he was “going to 100k into getting an attorney.” (Exhibit

for January 19, 2017, after accepting Price’s not guilty plea. (Exhibit

p. 3, L. 3);

B

conference testiﬁed

that,

BAC
for a

who handled

the

enhancement and

March

31, 2017,

March

31, 2017,

although he had no speciﬁc recollection of that particular

pre-trial conference,

it

his usual practice at such pre-trial conferences to ask

is

unrepresented defendants

if

any

they Wish t0 secure representation and to either continue the

case if they Wish t0 hire an attorney or t0 provide a public defender application if they wish

appointment 0f counsel. (TL,
stated that he

p. 7, L.

23 — p.

15, L. 5.)

At the change ofplea hearing Price

was representing himself for purposes 0f accepting

pleading guilty. (Exhibit

B

the state’s plea offer and

(TL, p. 4, Ls. 8-9).)

This record shows that Price understood his right t0 counsel.

an attorney. If he had wanted more time t0 secure his

have stipulated

to

and

it,

if

own

He looked into getting

attorney the prosecutor

would

he had wanted to be represented by the public defender the

prosecutor would have provided the application. Price instead decided to accept the state’s
plea agreement offer.

He

afﬁrmatively represented t0 the court

at the

change 0f plea

hearing that he was representing himself. This record shows at least a reasonable inference
that Price, with full

U.S.

knowledge of his

rights, elected “to forgo representation.”

M,

541

at 87.

The
in the prior

district court implicitly

DUI by

crucial issue

when he

choosing t0 represent himself.

was whether

(R., p. 79.)

For the

district court the

Price “intended t0 relinquish 0r abandon his right t0 counsel”

represented himself. (R., p. 79 (emphasis original).) Only the erroneous reversal

0f the burden of proof explains the

waive

recognized that Price could waive his right to counsel

his right to counsel

district court’s

by representing

conclusion that Price did not intend to

himself.

Price argues that the district court’s reversal 0f the burden of proof

was harmless

because he demonstrated that the record was “silent as to his alleged waiver.”
(Respondent’s

brief, p. 5.)

Although

it is

true that “waiver

of counsel cannot be presumed

from a

silent record,”

such presumption attaches only where the record does not contain

“any indication” that the defendant has elected to proceed Without counsel. State V. Farfan-

M,

161 Idaho 610, 614-15, 389 P.3d 155, 159-60 (2016) (emphasis added). Likewise,

there

no “prescribed.

is

.

.

formula 0r script to be read t0 a defendant

elects t0 proceed without counsel.” To_wr,

541 U.S.

at

who

states that

he

87 (emphasis added). Read together

(and Farfan—Galvan cannot be read contrary t0 binding precedent from the Supreme Court

0f the United

States), Price is not entitled t0 a

presumption that he was denied counsel

unless he afﬁrmatively demonstrates that the record in the underlying criminal conviction

does not contain “any” indication that proceeding Without counsel was Price’s choice.
Rather than being devoid 0f “any” indication that Price chose to proceed without
counsel, the record in this case

himself.

As shown

is

replete with evidence that Price in fact elected to represent

above, the record shows Price was informed 0f his rights to counsel

(including having one provided at government expense), understood those rights, looked

into obtaining counsel

0n

his

own, decided

t0 accept a favorable plea

agreement despite

having a prosecutor Willing to stipulate t0 more time t0 ﬁnd private counsel or to provide

an application for the public defender, and represented to the court that he was representing
himself for purposes 0f entering his plea.
factual question 0f

Whether Price chose

t0

Because the record reﬂects,

for application of the correct

a

minimum,

a

proceed Without counsel as opposed t0 being

denied his right to counsel, this Court cannot declare the
the burden 0f proof harmless.

at

district court’s error in reversing

Thus, the order must be vacated and the matter remanded

burden 0f proof and the correct legal standards.

The Record Afﬁrmativelv Shows Price Did Not Meet His Burden Of Proof

C.

However,
reverse

it

this

Court should not merely vacate the

district court’s order,

but should

because the record in this case shows that Price did not meet his burden ofproving

was not

that proceeding without counsel

A

his choice.

defendant

representation” and “elect[] t0 proceed Without counsel.”

a collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction,

it is

“choose t0 forgo

may

To_m, 541 U.S.

at 87-88.

“[I]n

the defendant’s burden t0 prove that

he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to the assistance 0f counsel.” Li
at 92.

The record in this case shows

by choosing

that Price failed t0

prove that he did not waive counsel

to “forgo representation” 0r that the choice t0

knowingly and

intelligently

The record of

waive counsel was not

made.

DUI shows

the underlying

that (1) Price

understood his right t0

counsel, including his right t0 appointed counsel (Exhibit A, at 00:30

(TL, p. 2, Ls. 4-10)); (2) Price looked into getting his
Ls. 15-18)); (3) there

p. 3, L. 3);

t0 inquire

at the

00:40; Exhibit

attorney (Exhibit

was a scheduled pretrial conference 0n January

evidence of What happened

—

own

—

19,

scheduled pretrial conference (Exhibit

B

(TL, p. 2,

20 1 7, Without any

B

(TL, p. 2, L. 21

Exhibit C); (4) the prosecutor’s normal practice at pre-trial conferences

Whether an unrepresented defendant wanted

t0

B

was

be represented by counsel and

then either continue the case or provide a public defender application if the defendant did

wish

to

be represented (TL,

p. 8, L.

pursuant to Which the state

14

made

—

p. 15, L. 5); (5) Price

accepted a plea agreement

valuable concessions (Exhibit D); and (6) Price

afﬁrmatively stated that he was representing himself at the change 0f plea hearing (Exhibit

B

(TL, p. 4, Ls. 4-9)).

proceedings,

show

These

facts, established

that Price’s lack

by

the record of the underlying

0f representation by an attorney

at the guilty

DUI
plea

hearing was the result 0f his
counsel.

As

own informed

choice, and not any denial of the right to

the district court determined, Price presented

Whether Price “intended t0 relinquish or abandon his right
original», and therefore presented

own

choice. Price failed t0

judgment should have been

meet

n0 evidence

n0 evidence 0n the question of

t0 counsel” (R., p.

that his self—representation

burden of proof and his

his

79 (emphasis

was not by

collateral attack

his

0n the prior

rejected.

Price argues he “merely informed the court that he

was representing himself” and

“did not say that he Wished t0 represent him[self] 0r was making an election to represent
himself.” (Respondent’s brief, p. 6.)

one

is

He summarizes

“Simply

stating that

representing himself is not a waiver of the right to counsel.” (Id.) This argument,

ignores most 0f the record, however, and

sort

his argument:

is

ultimately a plea for this Court t0 impose

some

of formula or script 0n the waiver of counsel.

A
Range,

waiver

“is

a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a

LLC V. Citadel Storage, LLC,

can be n0 doubt on
including one paid

this

by

166 Idaho 592,

record that Price

the state if he

“known

was

_, 462 P.3d 120, 129 (2020).

knew of his
indigent.

known right.”

right t0

The

m
There

be represented by counsel,

right t0 counsel in the underlying

case

was

right

of representation by counsel When he represented himself. Because exercise of the

right

of self—representation necessarily waives the right to be represented by counsel, and

therefore a

right.”

The only

issue

is

Whether Price “relinquished” the

because Price presented n0 evidence that his self—representation was not the product of his

own choice but was

instead forced

upon him by a

denial 0f counsel, Price did not

burden 0f proving that he did not knowingly and voluntarily
counsel.

elect t0

meet

his

proceed without

Price’s

counsel

is

argument

inaccurate.

that the record is silent as to

The record demonstrates

that

whether he waived the right

t0

he knowingly and intelligently

exercised his right to self—representation, Which necessarily waived the right t0 counsel. In
the absence of evidence that self—representation

conclusion that can be reached

is

was not

that Price failed t0

that

he did not voluntarily and

Because analysis 0f the record under the

knowingly forego representation by counsel.
proper legal standards leads to only one

show

his voluntary choice, the only

result, the district court’s

order must be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The

state requests this

Court t0 reverse the

district court’s

order of dismissal.

In

remanded

for

the alternative, the state requests that the order be vacated and the case

application of the correct burden 0f proof.

DATED this 25th day of August, 2020.
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